Certify X509 Validation
Certify - X509 certificate validation
I always knew that validating a certificate chain presented by a peer is not an easy procedure, but my recent work in Certify to port over the procedure from Chromium has only proven that I underestimated the complexity of it. Certificate revocation seems to be a particularly hard issue, with 2 main categories of solutions - offline and online validation.
Online validation - OCSP
OCSP is a protocol designed to allow checking the revocation status of a certificate by sending a request over a subset of HTTP/1.1. At first glance, it seems it solves the status checking problem on its own. However, OCSP has problems, inherent to online checking.
First of all, the validation server might not be currently available - so a lack of response is most definitely not a state in which a chain can be trusted. Secondly, the check may be slow, after all, it requires connecting to a separate service. Additionally, the native Windows API for certificate verification does the status check synchronously, which means potentially blocking a user’s thread that typically services asynchronous operations. There is a feature that alleviates most of these issues, at least from the point of view of a TLS client, OCSP stapling. Sadly, it’s not very widespread and actually few large services support it, due to the fact that it increases bandwidth requirements. Certify will, at some point support both OCSP status checks on the client side and support for OCSP stapling. The problem here is that OCSP requires a fairly functional HTTP client and ASN.1 parsing. A lot of this functionality is already present in OpenSSL, however, integrating it with ASIO and Beast may be tricky.
Offline validation - CRLs and Google CRLSets
The traditional method of checking the status of a certificate involves looking up revocation lists installed in the OS’s store, or downloaded by the application from the CA. Unfortunately CRLs have issues - an example would be an incident from a few years ago when CloudFlare performed a mass revocation which blew up the size of the CRLs by a few orders of magnitude, resulting in a requirement to download multiple megabytes of data, turning CAs into a major performance bottleneck. Google came up with a different mechanism, called CRLSets, which involves a periodic download of a revocation list which is created by Google’s crawler querying certificate status over OCSP. This verification method is fairly attractive for applications that run on systems that already have Google products, since this database is shared, which is why I’ve chosen to provide an opt-in implementation in Certify. For now, updating the database will be out of scope, because that requires a few utilties that are missing from Boost at this time (XML, JSON and an HTTP Client).
Don’t forget to star the repository: https://github.com/djarek/certify!